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ABSTRACT   
This paper exploits the observability of control messages in a control network to formally 
monitor safety properties to verify a control application’s correct behaviour. A monitor 
scheme is proposed based on a runtime verification method, which can verify selected 
properties of an application’s behaviour, including the verification of formally specified 
functional safety properties. A prototype hardware based circuit is developed to provide a 
monitor function. A case study example for an automotive gearbox control system is 
presented. The control application is evaluated in the target application environment, which is 
a controller area network (CAN) based network. The behaviour of the monitor is assessed and 
the results show that it is feasible to monitor and verify functional safety properties, as 
defined by the ISO 26262 standard for functional safety in road vehicles, using the proposed 
method. 
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1.   Introduction 
 
Many control system designs are based on control network or sensor-level networks so that 
functionality can be distributed in space. Applications are found in industrial automation, 
transport vehicles, and many other fields. A large number of such small networks are 
employed in safety-critical applications and there are increasing demands from regulatory 
agencies and industries for product developers to ensure compliance with functional safety 
requirements.  
 
Functional safety is an integrated part of the overall safety requirements for a product and is 
concerned with assuring that a system or equipment item operates correctly; taking into 
account the safe management of likely operator errors, system failures and environmentally 
induced problems.  
 
This paper investigates the feasibility of monitoring safety property requirements for an 
application that runs in a control network based system, in real-time. The aim is to develop a 
specialised monitor device, which is a programmable hardware based circuit that observes the 
behaviour of an application in real time and reports on violations. The work suggests that 
conventional control network architectures lend themselves to the development of runtime 
monitoring schemes in a useful way where the various control messages are exposed on the 
network and the set of these messages can be interpreted in formal logic equations to inform 
an observer about the behaviour of some key properties. It is specifically proposed that such a 
monitor can be used to observe functional safety properties.  
 
A case study example illustrates how such a monitor can be developed for an automotive 
application which is based on the controller area network (CAN) bus [1]. The case study 
example is based on a software controlled automotive gearbox, which can be seen as an 
important equipment item for safety evaluation.  
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Two distinct use cases are evaluated for the monitor employment. The first use case is where 
the development engineer carries out the verification process as part of the product 
development cycle, using the runtime monitor as a development tool. The second use case is 
where the runtime monitor is permanently installed in the system and is used to verify the 
correct behaviour of an application, through the lifetime of the product. 
 
Based on the case study example it is demonstrated that it is feasible to verify functional 
safety properties for a product using such runtime verification. However, the value of using 
such a monitor for lifetime monitoring within a product has questionable benefits. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: section 2 describes some background for 
functional safety and runtime monitoring; section 3 summarises related research work; section 
4 introduces the gear controller case study and its requirements; section 5 describes the case 
study implementation; section 6 discussed the evaluation and testing for the concept; and 
section 7 summarises the conclusions. 
 
2. Background 
 
Runtime monitoring for checking the performance behaviour of embedded systems’ 
applications is an established field.  In this study the concept is extended to the monitoring of 
functional safety properties. 
  
2.1 Functional safety 
Functional Safety is achieved by product developers by designing and developing products to 
ensure all specified safety functions are implemented; and the level of performance required 
of each safety function is met. This is usually achieved by a development process that 
involves: identifying the formally required safety functions, based on risk assessment and 
management; assessment of the risk-reduction required by the safety function; ensuring the 
safety function performs to the design intent; and verifying that the system meets the assigned 
safety integrity levels. Then there is a requirement to conduct Functional Safety audits to 
assess evidence that the appropriate safety lifecycle management techniques are being applied 
consistently in the relevant lifecycle stages of a product.  
 
2.2 The functional safety standards 
Probably the best known functional safety standard in the electronics industry is the IEC 
61508 functional safety standard and its automotive adaptation ISO 26262 [2]. The IEC 
61508 document defines four general Safety Integrity Levels (SILs), where SIL 4 represents 
the most stringent safety level. The ISO 26262 document defines four Automotive Safety 
Integrity Levels (ASILs) where ASIL D is the most stringent safety level. Each level 
corresponds to the likelihood of failures for a safety function.  
 
The ISO 26262 does not specify any development processes or technologies. Rather it 
assumes that development processes such as ISO 9001, CMM or similar process are already 
in place and imposes specific safety related requirements and outcomes on them.  
 
2.3 Runtime monitoring  
In this paper it is proposed that an independent monitor can be developed to monitor key 
safety properties during product runtime to confirm proper behaviour of an application during 
its execution phase. Such a runtime verification monitor is concerned with the monitoring of 
program execution behaviour so as to establish compliance with a requirements specification. 
The properties to be observed can be decided by the developers to gain confidence in the 
correct operation of the product or system.  
 
3 
 
The concept of the proposed runtime monitor makes the following key assumptions: 
 
a) The runtime environment on its own cannot detect violations of an application’s safety 
properties. Traditional means of node diagnostics and network diagnostics cannot have 
awareness of an application’s specifications. 
 
b) It is not sufficient to verify the behaviour of functional safety properties outside of the 
actual runtime environment. The verification of properties outside of the runtime context 
cannot make realistic assumptions on how the implementation environment can impact 
on the application’s behaviour in terms of functionality and timing. 
 
c) The evaluation of the safety properties will not lead to erroneous conclusions resulting in 
false negatives. This is assuming the monitor itself does not fail and all runtime 
parameters that can impact on the verification are accounted for. 
 
d) The target system will expose sufficient global variables to the network so that the 
monitor logic can be meaningfully expressed by observing the exported messages. 
 
e) The assertion check process is sufficiently fast so that verification can be achieved in 
real-time while the system is executing. 
 
In the proposed scheme the requirement specification of a system is stated as an executable 
specification that describes the behaviour of the system. That described system model is 
formally verified using a model-checker that can verify timed behaviour. Program code is 
generated from the specification model for product implementation. At runtime, selected 
properties that have already been formally verified in the model checker are evaluated. This 
evaluation during runtime is a form of verification that is based on assertion testing [3]. 
 
 
 
3.  Related work 
 
A runtime verification monitor is concerned with the monitoring of program execution 
behaviour to establish compliance with a requirements specification. The concept of 
monitoring system behaviour during runtime is well established as a means to employ a 
‘lightweight’ formal verification method to assess runtime compliance behaviour in 
accordance with a product’s requirement specifications. Runtime monitoring methods have 
been proposed by Havelund and Roşu [4], Drusinsky [5], Havelund et al [6], and Sammapun 
[7], amongst others. The Monitoring and Checking (MaC) framework, by Lee et al [8] and  
Kim et al [9], proposes a scheme to automatically link low-level observations of program 
execution behaviour to the relevant monitored properties. PathExplorer (PAX) is a runtime 
verification tool by Havelund and Roşu [10] that uses linear temporal logic (LTL). Watterson 
et al. [11] provide an in-depth review in the context of the requirements for monitoring in 
embedded systems. Michael et al. [12] describe runtime execution monitoring schemes to 
assess whether formal assertions correctly capture the intent of some natural language 
requirements.  
 
Many of the proposed methods to date are focused on solutions that perform on-line 
monitoring, and employ off-line processing of captured traces from the monitoring exercises. 
In the work described in this paper, a monitor device is proposed that can be embedded right 
into the product. The need for trace memory can be eliminated by using state by state 
evaluations during runtime. 
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Interest in evaluation for safety conformance in products spans many engineering disciplines 
as described by Saleh et al [13]. In recent times there is growing emphasis on the 
development of software related safety cases, as discussed by Hawkins et al. [14]. However, 
the concept of mapping specific safety requirements from a safety standard to runtime 
monitored properties is not well explored in the research literature. Clauses 7 and 8 of ISO 
26262-6, which refer to software architectural design and software unit design respectively, 
each point to external monitoring techniques as a means of attaining ISO 26262 compliance, 
while the test case derivations covered by clauses 9 (Software Unit Testing) and 10 (Software 
integration and testing) lend themselves to a monitoring approach.  
 
In automotive systems the need for behaviour monitoring is well understood, but solutions to 
the problems are incomplete. One significant outcome from research on these issues is the 
development of the AUTOSAR (AUTomotive Open System ARchitecture) [15] standard. 
AUTOSAR is an open, standardised software architecture for automotive E/E 
(Electrics/Electronics) systems; providing an infrastructure to assist with the development of 
in-vehicle software for the entire product lifecycle. Although the AUTOSAR 
recommendations are open to the inclusion of software monitoring, they do not suggest any 
formal approach. Lotoczky et al. [16] suggest a monitoring and debugging platform for 
AUTOSAR software components that reside on a target ECU, to assess the performance of a 
Software Component (SWC) and assist in debugging any anomalies discovered at this level. 
 
 
4.  Case study: requirements and the monitor logic 
 
A case study is presented to illustrate the concept of monitoring defined system properties. A 
formal logic is selected to exactly specify the individual properties. 
 
4.1  The case study 
An automotive system, a gearbox controller, is considered for a case study example. This type 
of programmable E/E system falls within the scope of the ISO 26262 process for Functional 
Safety consideration. The software for the gearbox controller requires hardware on which to 
run, so the gearbox project software development is part of a gearbox system, including 
hardware and software components. The gearbox controller, therefore, requires an overall 
project plan, a safety plan, and a functional safety concept, including the ASIL level 
determination for the project.  
 
As part of the product development process, the gearbox controller project will have a 
Functional Safety Assessment and a Functional Safety Audit leading to the definition of a set 
of Functional Safety Requirements for the development, as per Part 3 of the ISO 26262 
standard. A technical safety concept and a set of technical safety requirements follow from 
these analyses. These analyses and assessments are included in the System Level Product 
Development and subsequently in the hardware and software product development.  
 
The gearbox control module has the potential to cause significant harm, for example, by 
engaging an incorrect gear, or by failing to engage, but not immediate fatality, so for this 
example a notional ASIL level of C is suggested. In practice, determination of the appropriate 
ASIL level is a significant task for the project team, as part of the functional safety and 
technical safety activities mentioned above. These are the ultimate responsibility of the Safety 
Manager (as set out in Part 2 of the standard).  
 
The use of an external monitoring facility to perform a ‘watchdog’ function is suggested here. 
In common with most embedded software development projects, ISO 26262 prefers testing of 
‘production-intent hardware and software’ to ‘instrumented code’. The type of monitor 
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discussed in this paper supports the concept of observability of software performance using 
production code.  
 
4.2  Choice of logic for the monitor 
A key requirement of the monitor logic is to allow specific functional safety statements to be 
expressed as logic formulae that can be evaluated ‘on-the-fly’ so that the runtime behaviour 
of the system for such properties can be verified during a product’s normal operating phases. 
For the case study example, the past time linear temporal logic (ptLTL) was chosen. This is a 
simple modal temporal logic. Amir Pnueli [17] defined the linear temporal logic (LTL) which 
gives a powerful formalism for the concise specification of complex systems. A variant of 
LTL is ‘past time LTL’ (ptLTL) which refers to past states of an execution trace relative to 
the current state.  An important feature of ptLTL for monitoring applications is that the 
satisfaction of a formula can be decided for the execution trace by evaluation of only the  
current state sn and its predecessor state sn−1. This negates the need for any special trace 
buffers, which can be costly and complex to implement. Figure 1 provides a brief summary of 
the ptLTL syntax and operators. 
 
 
The ptLTL formula and syntax 
 
The ptLTL formula ψ uses the following syntax: 
ψ  ::=   true | false | AP | ¬ ψ | ψ ∧ ψ | ψ ∨ ψ | ψ → ψ | ψ ↔ ψ   
 
AP is the set of atomic propositions which represent the predicates. The standard 
propositional binary operators are used e.g. ∧ (conjunction), ∨(disjunction) etc. 
 
Past time operators 
The basic past time operators allow temporal reasoning and are listed in exhibit a).  The 
monitoring operators are derived from the basic operators to provide a more intuitive and 
compact presentation, as shown in exhibit b). 
 
a) Basic past time operators  
 
Operator Description 
⊡ ψ  ‘always in the past ψ’; i.e. ψ was always true in the past. 
<> ψ ‘eventually in the past ψ’; i.e. ψ was true in a past state in time. 
⊙ψ  ‘previously ψ’; i.e. ψ  held in the immediately prior state. Past-time 
equivalent to the Next operator in LTL. 
ψ1 Ss ψ2 ‘ψ1 strong since ψ2’; i.e. ψ2 held at some state in the past, since then ψ1 has 
continued to hold true. 
ψ1 Sw ψ2 ‘ψ1 weak since ψ2’; i.e. ψ1 was true all of the time, or else (ψ1 Ss ψ2) 
 
b)  Monitoring operators  
 
Operator Description 
↑ψ ‘start  ψ’; i.e. ψ was false in the previous state and is true in the current state.  
Equivalent to basic operators:  ψ∧¬⊙ψ 
↓ψ ‘end ψ’; i.e. ψ was true in the previous state and is false in the current state.  
Equivalent to basic operators is:  ¬ψ∧⊙ψ 
[ ψ1 , ψ2 )s Strong interval operator. [ ψ1 , ψ2 )s  is true if ψ2 has not been true since the last 
time ψ1 was true, including the state where  ψ1 was true.  
[ ψ1 , ψ2 )w Weak interval operator. [ ψ1 , ψ2 )w  is true if it satisfies [ ψ1 , ψ2 )s  or if   ψ2 
was never true. 
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Figure 1   Summary of ptLTL formula syntax and operators 
 
4.3  Monitoring timed behaviour 
The ptLTL logic does not include features for the expression of physical time. In this case 
study example the monitor circuit includes physical clock/timer circuits in the hardware 
design, which are used for counting the progression of time to a resolution of 1 millisecond. 
Timer values are read at relevant times, in real time, and are used as variables for logic 
evaluations. 
 
 
 
5. Case study: implementation 
 
An automotive powertrain subsystem is developed to evaluate and demonstrate the feasibility 
of formally monitoring properties of a system based on sequences of network messages. 
 
5.1  Gear controller example  
 
The gearbox system design is based a prototype gear controller design, by Lindahl et al. [18]. 
The gearbox features five forward gears, a neutral gear and a reverse gear. The system uses a 
conventional controller area network (CAN) for communication between components. Figure 
2a) illustrates a flow graph for the gear controller system which consists of five major 
components. The GearControl component represents the fundamental controller for the 
vehicle’s transmission. 
 
The gear controller will change gear by requesting services from components in the system. A 
brief description of the components is presented: 
 
Interface: The interface accepts requests from the driver's gear stick or an automatic gear-
change algorithm. The Interface maintains status on the current status of the gear controller. 
 
The Gear Controller: The gear controller receives message requests via the Interface 
component, over the control network. A gear change is achieved in the following steps: 
 
1) accomplish a zero torque transmission, so that the current gear can be released 
2) the current gear is actually released 
3) the controller now adjusts for  synchronous speed across the transmission 
4) the move to the new gear is set 
5) increase the engine torque to the same wheel tongue level as before the gear change  
 
Under some driving conditions the engine might not be able to achieve zero torque or 
synchronous speed over the transmission, within defined time ranges. In this case the clutch is 
opened to facilitate the gear change. Once the clutch is open the path between engine and 
wheels is broken and the gearbox can then set the new gear as there now is no need for zero 
torque and synchronous speed. As the clutch physically closes it bridges the differences in 
speed and torque between the engine and the wheels. 
 
The gearbox 
The gearbox is expected to set a gear within the timeframe 100 to 300 ms and to release a 
gear in the timeframe 100 to 200 ms. If the maximum times are exceeded the gearbox will 
stop in an error state. 
 
The clutch 
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This is an electrically controlled clutch which opens or closes within the timeframe 100 to 
150 ms. If time bounds are not accomplished then an error state is reached. 
 
The engine 
The engine is used to establish zero torque and synchronous speed over the transmission. The 
engine has three modes of operation:  
 
1) normal mode – engine provides the requested engine torque 
2) zero torque mode – engines seeks to establish zero torque difference over the 
transmission 
3) synchronous speed mode - engines seeks to establish zero speed difference between 
engine and the wheels 
 
The maximum time bound to achieve zero torque is 400 ms. The maximum time bound to 
achieve synchronous speed is 500 ms.  
 
 
 
ClutchGearBox Engine
Interface
GearControl
ReqNewGear (FromGear) (ToGear)? NewGear!
ReqSet!
ReqNeu!
GearSet?
GearNeu?
OpenClutch!
CloseClutch!
ClutchIsOpen?
ClutchIsClosed?
ReqSpeed!
ReqTorque!
ReqZeroTorque!
SpeedSet?
TorqueZero?
 
 
a) Flow graph diagram 
 
ClutchGearBox Engine
Interface GearControl
Other CAN
traffic
CAN bus (125 kbps)
 
 
b) Block diagram of the implementation 
 
Figure 2  Gear controller diagrams 
 
 
Table 1 shows a full list of the CAN messages that derive from the gearbox system design. It 
is this set of messages that form the inputs to the monitor circuit. 
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Message Semantics of the message 
ReqNewGear 
(FromGear) (ToGear)? 
Interface requests GearControl to change from current to a new gear 
NewGear! Gear change request is completed and now vehicle is in a new gear 
ReqSet! GearControl requests the GearBox to set a new gear 
GearSet? GearBox confirms that new gear is now set 
ReqNeu! GearControl requests the GearBox to set gear to neutral  
GearNeu? GearBox confirms that neutral gear is now set 
OpenClutch! GearControl requests the Clutch to open 
ClutchIsOpen? The Clutch confirms that the clutch is now open 
CloseClutch! GearControl requests the Clutch to close 
ClutchIsClosed? The Clutch confirms that the clutch is now closed 
ReqSpeed! GearControl requests the Engine to set speed 
SpeedSet? The Engine confirms that the speed is now set 
ReqZeroTorque! GearControl requests the Engine to achieve a zero torque state 
TorqueZero? The Engine confirms that the torque is now at zero 
ReqTorque! GearControl requests the Engine to set torque (i.e. it releases zero torque 
state, there is no message response expected in the design). 
Table 1  List of CAN messages 
 
Figure 2b) shows a block diagram for the gear controller implementation. A module called 
‘Other CAN traffic’ is added to suggest there is other CAN message traffic on the same bus. 
The CAN bus data rate is set to 125 kbps in this case study example.  
 
Figure 3 shows a timed automaton for GearControl component. The model is a simple finite 
state machine, which is extended with clock variables. The state machine was generated from 
a formal specification requirements document, using Uppaal [19]; a tool that is capable of 
modelling, simulating and verifying real-time systems. The resulting automaton for the 
GearControl  represents a key part of the product’s requirements’ specification.  
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Figure 3  Timed automaton for GearControl component 
 
Figure 4 shows an example of a natural language description for a required behavioural 
condition that represents a safety property that must be always respected when opening the 
clutch in a gear box system. The example is intended to illustrate the concept of precisely 
describing an English language statement in a formal logic.  
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Figure 4   Example condition expressed in natural language and in ptLTL  
 
 
5.2  The monitor hardware 
A hardware-based runtime monitor circuit is developed to non-intrusively monitor the 
message traffic on the CAN bus so as to establish representations for runtime events, which 
model atomic propositions (AP). This logically represents a trace of runtime events as a finite 
word over the AP, and a monitor can check for inclusion in the language generated by the 
relevant ptLTL formulae.  
 
 
 
CAN bus
CAN
node
CAN bus
Monitor
a)  Monitor directly attached to the CAN bus via separate port
b)  Monitor attached using an existing CAN port on the bus
CAN
node
CAN
node
CAN
node
Monitor
  
     
Figure 5  The monitor connected to the CAN bus 
 
 
Figure 5 illustrates a block diagram for the hardware monitor architecture. The monitor 
circuit, excluding the bus transceiver, is instantiated in the fabric of a single integrated circuit. 
The CAN bus is monitored by a CAN bus ‘sniffer’ component and messages of interest are 
captured, based on their known message identifiers. Note, this arrangement is a passive 
monitor to the CAN bus. For example, in the case of a corrupted received message, this node 
would not attempt to react by sending an error frame as dictated by the normal CAN protocol. 
The following additional components make up the monitor scheme: 
 
Filter – an AP evaluator  
Natural language description: 
“The system must absolutely guarantee that the maximum allowed time for a complete gear change 
operation, to any forward gear, is 1000 msec, however, if the clutch is used during this gear change 
operation, then the maximum allowed time is not to be longer than 1250 msecs.” 
 
The corresponding ptLTL formula: 
 
Ψ1 :=    ↑( NewGear?  ∧ (ToGear   >  0) )   →   
 [  (  [ReqNewGear! , OpenClutch!)s ) ,      SysTimerExt  >  1000 ) S  ) 
∨ [ ! (  [ReqNewGear! , OpenClutch!)s ) ,      SysTimerExt  >  1250 ) S  )  
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The filter component is a logic circuit that performs on-the-fly evaluation of each atomic 
proposition. The filter is connects directly to the CAN bus sniffer and includes a logic unit to 
represent each AP element, which can include a CAN message, a message parameter, or a 
timer value. The filter outputs the AP set, for example the AP includes (SysTimerExt  >  
1250),  (OpenClutch!), (ToGear   >  0) etc. 
 
Event recogniser – state change update event detector 
The combination of the AP updates from the filter unit represents a state change, based on a 
reconstructed state diagram. The output from the event recogniser includes the atomic 
propositions. 
 
Runtime checker - formula verdict evaluation 
The runtime formula checker establishes that for each event the truth of a formula ψ can be 
decided in order to establish if a trace t satisfies ψ (t  ⊨  ψ  ), up to the current state. Under a 
failure situation, the ‘Result’ output advises on which formula failed and this can be flagged 
to the user via a defined interface.  
 
Independent clock/timers 
Figure 6 shows the inclusion of some independent hardware clock/timers to the monitor 
circuit.  
 
 
 
Runtime checker
 formula eval
Event recogniser
 state changes
Filter
AP evaluation
Result out
CAN bus
sniffer
(dedicated hardware)
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External interface
Monitor
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t
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k
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Single
Integrated
Circuit
CAN bus
 
Figure  6  Block diagram for the hardware monitor architecture 
 
 
 
 
 
5.3  Verifying properties 
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The specification of the gear controller design was reviewed, and some selected example 
safety statements, or requirements, were translated into properties which can be expressed as 
ptLTL formulae. The scope of the ISO 26262 Standard encourages this approach.  
 
In the experimental system, twelve safety properties were defined. Two of the safety 
properties will be presented here as examples to illustrate the scheme. A formal equation is 
written to represent an intended safety property. Consider the following two stated safety 
requirements. 
 
- Gear change safety watch dog timer 
An example requirement states that the system must absolutely guarantee that the maximum 
allowed time for a complete gear change operation, to any forward gear, is 1000 msec, 
however, if the clutch is used during this gear change operation, then the maximum allowed 
time is not to be longer than 1250 msecs. The equivalent ptLTL formula is: 
 
Ψ1 :=    ↑( NewGear?  ∧ (ToGear   >  0) )   →   
 [  (  [ReqNewGear! , OpenClutch!)s ) ,      SysTimerExt  >  1000 )S  ) 
∨ [ ! (  [ReqNewGear! , OpenClutch!)s ) ,      SysTimerExt  >  1250 )S  ) 
 
Using data generated during the configuration of the CAN bus messages, each message has a 
unique identifier, so message names can be used as symbols in the formula presentation, and 
can be easily interpreted by the monitor. 
 
Note, time variables from the observed application are not exported as message variables on 
the CAN bus, so the monitor will need to have its own sense of time, based on independent 
clocks, as noted earlier. In the equation above the SysTimerExt represents one of the 
monitor’s own timers. 
 
 
- Safe behaviour of clutch operation 
Another example safety requirement states that the system must absolutely guarantee that it 
will not normally open the clutch, but only in the following cases: 1) when changing from one 
forward gear to another forward gear, and the zero torque is not achieved, or 2) when 
changing from one forward gear to another and zero torque is achieved, but then the 
synchronous speed is not achieved. The equivalent ptLTL formula is: 
 
Ψ2 :=    ↑(OpenClutch!)  →   
 ( (FromGear > 0)  ∧ (ToGear > 0 ))  
  ∧  (  [  RegNewGear?  ,  (TorqueZero?  )S   ∨ (  [  TorqueZero?  ,   (SpeedSet?)S ) 
 
 
5.4  The monitor’s resources and scaling up 
In the prototype implementation for the monitor the number of logic cells required is 
proportional to the number of atomic propositions that are to be observed by the filter 
component, and on the number of ptLTL formulae that are to be evaluated by the runtime 
checker, i.e. the number of safety properties that are defined. However the inclusion of further 
safety properties does impact on the processing requirements overhead for the monitor as the 
evaluation time is prolonged. It is possible to design a dedicated processing model for the 
runtime checker that does not require a circuit implementation for each safety property and 
thus implies less hardware overhead on scaling up on the number of observed properties. 
Reinbacher et al.[20] propose such an architecture.   
 
5.5  Programming the safety properties 
The addition of a safety property involves taking a ptLTL formula as input and producing 
synthesizable VHDL code for a circuit which ‘checks’ that input formula. The code is then 
13 
 
processed in a synthesis tool for the target FPGA platform. The coding of the formulae is 
directly based on the algorithms presented by Havelund and Rosu [4].  
 
5.6  Monitor evaluation time considerations 
In a worst-case situation the monitor circuit will need to perform an evaluation during the 
time between the receipt events of two consecutive messages on the bus, where there is no 
time gap between the two messages. Considering the CAN bus example as used in the 
prototype example, the minimum size of the CAN frames used is 70 bits (excluding 
interframe spacing). At a bus bit rate of 125 kbps the time to send one message is 560 μsecs. 
For a 1Mbps CAN bus this message transfer time is 70 μsecs. The hardware monitor is 
capable of processing its evaluation within the 70 μsecs time slot. For faster networks 
however, for example fieldbus networks, this processing time would impose the need for 
some additional timing considerations. 
 
5.7 Applicability for other automotive networks 
The CAN network was chosen for the case study. Although CAN has been a dominant 
automotive control network for many years now, higher performance control networks such 
as FlexRay are used in applications that require higher-level features such as greater 
bandwidth, redundancy and more stringent real-time deterministic behaviour. The proposed 
runtime monitor concept can be applied in other such control network architectures where the 
control messages can be observed ‘on the fly’ by a network based node. The network 
topology, i.e. linear bus, star, hybrid etc., will not be an issue as long as the message set can 
be observed by a monitor node. However, restrictions can apply for some of the more 
advanced control network protocols which are now emerging. For example, the Time 
Sensitive Network (TSN) architecture is currently being proposed as a scheme that has the 
potential to become a future dominant standard for automotive networks. The TSN is a set of 
standards developed by the IEEE Time Sensitive Networking Task Group [21]. The standards 
define schemes and mechanisms for the time-sensitive transmission of data over Ethernet 
networks. The standard will provide explicit path control, bandwidth and stream reservation, 
redundancy for data flows and distribution of control parameters for time synchronization and 
scheduling. The authors are contributors to this standard [22] and claim that the message 
monitor scheme can be realised within individual streams which effectively represent a virtual 
network where messages are observable. However, if the control application spans multiple 
streams then a more complex solution to the observation of control messages will be required. 
For faster networks the processing time required for the monitor, i.e. within the latency time 
of a single message, will be more challenging.  
 
5.8  The prototype evaluation environment 
A prototype evaluation system was developed to support the experimental work. The system 
is illustrated in figure 7. Five experimental nodes form the gear controller; as shown in the 
diagram below the CAN bus network. This gear controller represents an automotive 
powertrain, which combines the following: GearControl, GearBox, Clutch, Engine and the 
Interface. Each one of these nodes represents a separate ECU that emulates the behaviour of a 
real component, e.g.  the GearBox emulates the functionality of a real automotive gearbox. 
Each node is implemented based on the following technology: 
 
- a single Spartan-II FPGA integrated circuit 
- on-chip IP for a CAN controller core 
- on-chip ECU application as modelled and formally verified on Uppaal tools 
- an off-chip CAN transceiver 
 
The safety property monitor node is implemented as a separate CAN node as seen on the 
upper part of figure 7 and includes the following features: 
 
- a single Spartan-II FPGA integrated circuit 
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- on-chip IP for a CAN controller core 
- on-chip implementation of the monitor as represented in figure 6. 
-   runtime checker is implemented as a program on an on-chip PicoBlaze core 
- an off-chip CAN transceiver 
-   a serial interface to an external computer  
 
The external PC computer, connected to the monitor node, is used to program monitor 
features and to store experimental results. An oscilloscope/analyser is attached to the CAN 
bus for independent monitoring of CAN message frames and evaluation of their timing 
behaviour. This is an Agilent 6032A (2 GSa/s) oscilloscope which has a built-in CAN 2.0A 
triggering facility. 
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 with CAN trigger
Xilinx FPGA
with CAN
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user interface
 program control
Monitor
node
Xilinx FPGA
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Xilinx FPGA
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GearControl
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GearBox
node
Clutch
node
Engine
node
Interface
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Figure 7  The prototype evaluation environment  
 
 
5.9 The emulation models 
 
There exist on the market sophisticated models for emulation of the engine and gearbox 
components that can be targeted to FPGA implementations. For example engine emulation 
models are available from National Instruments, dDSPACE and others for use in the 
development of automotive ECUs (electronic control unit) to support the HIL (hardware in 
the loop) development process. However, in the prototype evaluation environment presented 
here much simpler models were developed to evaluate the concept of runtime evaluation. The 
node components are designed to provide programmable response times that allow the 
monitor scheme to be evaluated. For example the engine node reacts to the following signals, 
where the response time is the delay from receiving an input signal to providing an output 
signal: 
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The response time is pre-programmed for an experimental test run and a programmable 
variance feature is also implemented. 
 
Note, the implementation of the CAN network in the prototype evaluation environment is a 
real CAN compliant implementation [1] and it is not an emulation. Thus the system behaviour 
of that network in relation to its timing, jitter, message latency, arbitration etc is realistic for 
the evaluations and testing. The CAN transmission bit rate is programmable up to 1 Mbit/s. 
 
 
 
 6.  Evaluation and testing 
 
For the evaluation of the proposed runtime verification scheme it is important to consider the 
fault models that apply to the various aspects of the system development and then to devise 
some suitable tests to assess the validity of the scheme. 
 
6.1 Fault model for the gear controller application 
The gear controller application is first considered in isolation where the implementation in the 
CAN embedded system is abstracted away so that the focus can be on the design and 
conformance of the core gear controller application. For the application, a design error is 
where an executable specification of a design differs from the designer’s intent. In this project 
the designer’s intent for the gear controller product is expressed as a requirement specification 
[18] which is an executable specification that describes the behaviour of the system. Formal 
model-checking is carried out for the design based on the Uppaal tool suite. A well-defined 
fault model is used to inform the testing, which includes the following features:  
 
 State coverage for all state reachability 
 Transition coverage to traverse all transitions  
 Reachability properties to assess if a given state formula can be satisfied by any 
reachable state 
 Safety properties to guarantee (invariantly) that some defined condition will never 
happen  
 Liveness properties to guarantee that something will eventually happen, e.g. any 
message that has been sent should eventually be received 
 
As stated in section 5 the overall gear controller design is implemented using five automata: 
GearControl, GearBox, Clutch, Engine, and Interface. The GearControl is centric to the 
design. The Uppaal tool, as a real-time model checker, was used to evaluate the full model, to 
include queries that cover all of the fault model cases. This provides confidence that the 
design was properly implemented in compliance with the specification, including all the 
timing requirements. The test results are provided in [18].  
 
 
6.2  Fault model for the CAN implementation environment 
A fault model for the implementation environment is assessed so that the impact of CAN 
based faults on the verification of the gear controller can be understood. The gear controller is 
Input  Output  Programmable 
response time  
Resolution  Programmable 
 variance 
ReqSpeed SpeedSet 50 to 350 msecs +/- 50 nsecs Yes 
ReqTorque None 500 msecs timeout n/a No 
ReqZeroTorque TorqueZero 50 to 200 msecs +/- 50 nsecs Yes 
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implemented in the test-bed environment as described in section 5. Consideration of a fault 
model for CAN might include the various processors, memories, CAN controller, CAN 
transceiver, watchdogs, and other hardware and software components. Faults such as: stuck-
at-dominant, stuck-at-recessive, bit-flipping, babbling-idiot etc. - all form part of the fault 
model. Resulting error information will typically impact on the network bus where 
communications can be corrupted and destroyed; even though the CAN protocol provides 
elaborate error detection schemes, and enables a node to  distinguish short disturbances from 
permanent failures, based on fault confinement mechanisms. 
 
In this paper it will be assumed that the CAN network and associated node processors are 
functioning correctly so the focus is on assessing the behaviour of the gear controller 
application in the CAN implementation environment, so that a safety manager can verify 
correct behaviour of an application based on the assumption that the underlying network 
behaves correctly. In other words the concern on CAN related faults is separated from the 
concern on the application’s behaviour for the purposes of verifying the behaviour of 
functional safety properties. Of course, CAN related failures will need to be understood and 
addressed in the overall safety certification of a full system. 
 
However, even with the assumption that a CAN system is working properly there still remain 
some important issues that will affect the functional performance of the hosted application. 
Some of the key issues are as follows: 
 
 
- In spite of the inherent error detection schemes in the CAN protocol, there still 
remains a total residual error probability for undetected corrupted messages, which is 
calculated [1] to be less than: (message error rate * 4.7 * 10-11 )  
 
- CAN is not a time-triggered network so contention for bus access gives rise to 
significant jitter times which can impact on the determinism of any hard real-time 
applications. 
 
-  
 
6.3  Fault model for the actual monitor node  
Vehicle design experience shows that adding fault protection to systems often increases 
complexity and thus the likelihood of a failure, where the fault protection logic itself can 
contribute to the failure. The monitor node and its potential unintended effects must be 
considered. Some of the following faults are possible:  
 
 CAN related faults at the monitor node, including: transceiver faults, possible 
erroneous transmission by CAN controller etc.  
 A false detection of a failure leads to an undesired system reaction with negative 
safety consequences. 
 Potential inconsistency can arise as CAN message errors in the last bits of the frame 
can force some nodes to accept a message while others reject it.  
 The real-time clock may drift or fail in other ways. 
 
 
6.4  Functional testing  
Functional testing was used to validate the correct functional behaviour of the gear controller 
application in the test-bed system and included the following tests: 
 
 All combinations of forward gear changes for conditions of no clutch activation 
 All combinations of gear changes for conditions without clutch activation 
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 All combinations of reverse gear select with and without clutch activation 
 
The emulated engine and clutch nodes contain timers that create simulated delays for 
parameters such as engine speed change, wheel torque change and clutch engage/disengage 
times. In normal behaviour there is some randomisation of these delays used to emulate real 
behaviour, within a predefined variance. There is the facility to program these delays to 
specific time values. 
 
6.5  Faults induced by the injection of deliberate programmed violations 
In the design of the test strategy a number of features of the observed program were modified 
so that the system would behave in a manner that would violate some specific requirements. 
In this way the behaviour of the monitor in its ability to detect such violations was assessed. 
Ten such tests were devised, where table 2 illustrates four example deliberate violations 
which are detectable by the monitor.  
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Test 
No. 
Nature of the test The program violation Result  
T001 Test for an abnormally slow 
clutch operation   
An error was injected 
by programming an 
additional 500 msecs 
delay into the clutch 
function. 
Formula evaluation successfully 
detected the violation as the total 
gear change operation exceeded 
1250 msecs 
T002 Test for correct conditions 
for operating the clutch 
An error was injected 
in the program by 
calling a clutch open 
operation even 
though the system 
had achieved zero 
torque. 
Formula evaluation successfully 
detected the violation  
T003 A programmed error 
requests to open the clutch 
too early, before torque is 
checked. 
In S1, OpenClutch! is 
signalled. 
The monitor’s ptLTL formula 
detects the violation and the error 
result is flagged. 
T004 Although a reverse gear is 
requested, a programmed 
error during runtime requests 
a sync speed to the engine.. 
In S5, ReqSpeed! is 
signalled.  
The monitor’s ptLTL formula 
detects the violation and the error 
result is flagged. 
Table 2  Example fault injections by program violation  
 
 
6.6  Timing Tests 
A number of timing tests were performed so as to functionally assess the real-time behaviour 
compliance of the gear controller system. One exemplary test is reported here; which is 
referred to as the GearChangeFirstSecond test. The test was configured as follows: 
 
1)   The set up was as shown in figure 7. 
2)   The Interface module initiates a ReqNewGear message to change from first to second 
gear. The gear change operation concludes with the Interface receiving the NewGear 
message. 
3)   The tests were run, under programmed control, for thousands of iterations for 
       various combinations of programmed response times. 
 
Three selected test cases, which have interesting programmed response times, are listed in 
Table 3. The Test Case 1, in column 2 of the table shows the upper limits for response times, 
as specified in the requirements specification [18]. The Test Case 2 in column 3 shows 
responses times which are set at 97.5% of the upper limit values and Test Case 3 in column 3 
shows responses times which are set at 95% of upper limit values. The final row of the table 
shows the result status for each of the three test cases. The results show that there are some 
failures. The three test cases can be summarised as follows: 
 
TEST CASE 1 (Maximum limit response times) 
All response times are preset to the maximum limit response times of the requirements 
specification. 
Result: On repeated runs of the test, the gear change failed on each run.  
Observations: On issuing ReqZeroTorque, the GCTimer value exceeds 250 ms causing a 
transition to CheckClutch2 state and then the GCTimer value exceeds 150 ms causing a 
transition to the COopenError state. 
 
TEST CASE 2 (Maximum response times -  less 2.5%) 
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All response times are preset to 97.5% of the maximum limit response times of the 
requirements specification. 
Result: On repeated runs of the test, the gear change failed on each run. 
Observations: On issuing ReqZeroTorque, the GCTimer value exceeds 250 ms causing a 
transition to CheckClutch2 state and then the GCTimer value exceeds 150 ms causing a 
transition to the COopenError state. 
 
TEST CASE 3 (Maximum response times -  less 5%) 
All response times are preset to 95% of the maximum limit response times of the 
requirements specification. 
Result: On repeated runs, the gear change is correctly performed each time. The clutch is 
opened during the gear change but this is expected for the defined set of response times. 
 
 Test case 1 Test case 2 Test case 3 
Signal/Response Top limit for all 
response times 
msecs. 
Set response times 
to limits  -2.5% 
msecs. 
Set response times 
to limits  -5% 
msecs. 
ReqSpeed/ SpeedSet 500 487.5 475 
ReqTorque/ Undefined - - 
ReqZeroTorque/ 
TorqueZero 
400 390 380 
ReqSet/ GearSet 300 292.5 285 
ReqNeu/GearNeu 200 195 190 
ReqNewGear/ NewGear 1205 1175 1145 
OpenClutch/ ClutchIsOpen 150 146.25 142.5 
CloseClutch/ 
ClutchIsClosed 
150 146.25 142.5 
RESULT Fails always Fails always Never fails  
Table 3  Test cases for timing evaluation 
 
The Test Case 1 failure is predictable as the test is conducted on the limit of the timing 
specification. However, it is important to understand why failure occurs when the system is 
operated within the timing specifications, as in Test Case 2, which allows a 2.5% margin on 
the maximum timing limits. The application program has already been verified in the Uppaal 
formal model to show it to be compliant with respect to the timing requirement specifications. 
The reason for the non-compliance relates to the CAN’s message latency and jitter behaviour. 
Table 4 shows some actual readings where the influences of message latency time overhead 
and jitter are measured. The time measurement shown is the interval between two CAN bus 
messages: the response time from the receipt of a CloseClutch message to the receipt of the 
corresponding ClutchIsClosed message. 
 
Actual 
response 
 time µs 
Specified 
response 
 time µs 
Time 
difference 
µs 
Suggest explanation of difference in time 
152,153 150,000 2,153 Overhead of two required CAN messages 
153,291 150,000 3,291 Overhead of two required CAN messages 
 + one higher priority messages 
154,407 150,000 4,407 Overhead of two required CAN messages 
 + two higher priority messages 
155,519 150,000 5,519 Overhead of two required CAN messages 
 + three higher priority messages 
Table 4  Measured response times 
 
As stated in section 5 a CAN message will have a transmission latency time of some 1.04 ms 
Thus the two CAN messages add an overhead message delay time of 2.08 ms. Furthermore, 
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jitter in the CAN network occurs as a CAN controller may need to wait for higher priority 
messages to be sent before a lower priority message can be sent.  
 
A note on CAN timing calculation 
In the prototype implementation CAN messages are 8 bytes long. The length of the formatted 
CAN frame can be calculated. The maximum CAN frame size is not the simple arithmetic 
sum of all the bits in the frame. The CAN protocol imposes some additional bits to support a 
bit stuffing technique where a hamming distance of six is imposed on most of the fields in the 
CAN frame to ensure proper clock synchronisation. The upper bound on frame size may be 
calculated using the equation below: 
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In the equation, Sm is the number of bytes in the CAN data field for some message m. The 
value of m is assumed to be 8 in this application. A ‘Standard CAN’ frame format is assumed. 
The integer floor function in the equation is used to calculate the number of stuff bits. There 
47 other bits in the CAN frame. From this equation, the maximum frame size is thus 130 bits.  
 
At a CAN bit rate of 125 kbps (8 s bit time), such an eight-byte message will take (130 * 8) 
secs, or 1.04 ms to transmit on the bus. Note, the 1.04 ms is the theoretical maximum 
transmission time. The values in Table 5 above suggest some variance on the actual values. 
The actual CAN message transmission time will be influenced by the number of actual stuff 
bits and by jitter associated with the CAN controller’s internal operation. 
 
Furthermore, Davis et al [23] show response time analysis for CAN for calculation of the 
worst-case response time for each message, within the full priority based message set on the 
network. These values can then be compared to the message deadlines to determine if the 
system is schedulable.   
 
 
6.7  Conclusions on test and evaluation results 
The testing to date shows that it is feasible to formally verify properties of an application at 
runtime using the monitor scheme. The actual functional safety properties can be formally 
verified, first by a model checker and then in the real application environment.  
 
The test and evaluation conclusions need to be assessed separately for the two distinct 
proposed use cases for the runtime monitor. These use cases are as follows: 
 
Use Case #1 
The runtime monitor is used to verify the correct behavior of the gear controller application, 
which is operating in the CAN system. This task is carried out by the verification engineer as 
part of the product development cycle. Any detected failure conditions are observed by the 
engineer. Live test and measurement instruments are connected to the system under test as 
illustrated in figure 7. 
 
Use Case #2 
The runtime monitor is permanently installed in the system and is used to verify the correct 
behavior of the gear controller application, through the lifetime of the product. The system 
must react to any detected failure condition to bring the system to some defined safe state. 
There is no live test equipment connected to the system. 
 
Table 5 lists six major concerns that have been highlighted during the evaluation of the 
runtime monitor concept in the context of the case study. For the Use Case #1 the monitor can 
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successfully observe the functional behavior of the application and can verify the safety 
properties. The underlying behavior of the CAN network can be observed using test 
equipment and the concern issues with the network can be abstracted away from the runtime 
verification testing for the application. In other words, the impact of message latencies can be 
known for any test run and thus the time impact can be factored into the timing calculations. 
In the case of message errors during testing, a test can be re-run. This will allow the engineer 
to verify the behavior of the gear controller application in spite of violations that are 
introduced by the operation of the underlying network; thus separating the concerns for the 
application and for the host environment.  
 
However, the situation for Use Case #2 is very different. There are some significant concerns 
relating to the use of such a runtime monitor for product lifetime monitoring as the influence 
of the CAN network behavior cannot be separated from the measurements made by the 
monitor node. 
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Concern Nature of concern  Suggested actions 
USE CASE #1 
Suggested actions 
USE CASE #2 
Conclusion 
Residual error in 
CAN  
A ‘healthy’ network has a 
residual message error rate 
* 4.7 * 10-11 
Observe errors with 
test equipment and 
rerun verification. 
Safety Manager must 
decide if CAN 
reliability model is fit 
for purpose. 
Use Case #1 
has merit, in 
spite of 
residual error. 
Message latency 
and jitter 
Network latency jitter is 
significant and impacts on 
accuracy of verification. 
Measure latency 
with test equipment 
and factor out of 
measurements. 
Measurement margins 
need to be expanded. 
This may not be 
acceptable by Safety 
Manager.  
Use Case #1 
has merit. Use 
Case #2 has 
questionable 
merit. 
Intrusiveness of 
monitor faults 
The monitor itself can 
potentially introduce faults 
in the system. 
Observe monitor 
faults with test 
equipment and rerun 
verification. 
This is a serious 
reliability concern. 
Use Case #1 
has merit. Use 
Case #2 has 
reliability 
concern. 
Message 
observation 
point 
consistency 
There are known issues 
with CAN that lead to 
inconsistency of message 
observation. 
Observe 
inconsistencies with 
test equipment and 
rerun verification. 
This is a serious 
reliability concern as 
multiple monitoring is 
too complex. 
Use Case #1 
has merit. 
Solutions for 
Use Case #2 
are too 
complex. 
Underlying 
CAN errors and 
failures 
There are known fault 
models for CAN which 
give reliability concerns. 
Safety Manager 
must decide if CAN 
reliability model is 
fit for purpose. 
Safety manager must 
decide if CAN 
reliability model is fit 
for purpose. 
This is a 
separate issue 
from the use of 
a monitor. The 
monitor cannot 
improve the 
reliability 
model. 
Reaction to 
detecting an 
error. 
A reaction response to a 
monitor detected fault can 
itself be a serious safety 
concern. 
Not a concern as a 
reaction feature is 
proposed.  
Requires the reaction 
feature to consider in 
initial requirement 
specifications...  
Use Case #1 
has merit. 
Major 
concerns are 
introduced 
with Use Case 
#2.  
Table 5 Concerns resulting from the test evaluation work 
 
 
 
7.  Conclusions  
 
A new concept has been proposed whereby defined functional safety properties for an 
application can be formally monitored during the operating phase of a system, so that the 
application’s behaviour can be formally verified in its runtime environment. The ISO 26262 
standard for functional safety in road vehicles is used to guide the definition of the functional 
safety requirements. A monitor solution was developed that can observe safety properties in 
real time. The monitor can be realised on a single integrated circuit with relative modest gate 
count requirements. A scheme is proposed where a control network’s messages are observed 
and the sequencing and timing of such messages will accurately infer the proper system 
behaviour for selected properties. By this means no internal access to the system’s variables is 
required and the system is not aware of the monitor’s presence. 
 
A case study example for an automotive gearbox control system has been presented, which 
demonstrates the feasibility of the scheme. Example safety properties were defined and they 
were evaluated during the operating phase of the system. The timing behaviour of the monitor 
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was evaluated and the proposed method is shown to be feasible for real-time operation for a 
typical control network. The monitor can process its evaluations within a single message 
transfer time on the bus. Considerations so far have been focussed on relatively low-speed 
control networks. However, the concept will be extended to faster fieldbus and automotive 
networks.  
 
The results from the evaluation testing highlights the need for designers to take underlying 
network timing behaviour into consideration in the system specification phase; as a system’s 
real-time behaviour can be significantly influenced by the network operation. 
 
Two distinct use cases have been evaluated for the monitor deployment. The first use case is 
where the development engineer carries out the verification process as part of the product 
development cycle, using the runtime monitor as a development tool, and this is shown to 
provide a useful verification assessment for functional safety properties. However, the second 
use case, where the runtime monitor is permanently installed in the system and is used to 
continuously verify the correct behaviour of an application during product lifetime, is a much 
bigger challenge as the underlying network latencies and jitter characteristics make it difficult 
to measure real-time behaviour. Further, for the second use case, a decision on how to react to 
a safety violation raises complex safety questions which still need more investigation. 
 
The key aim of the research work has been met where the results have demonstrated that it is 
feasible to develop a monitor to verify functional safety properties in real time. However, 
there is still a lot of work to do as various questions have been raised during the course of the 
work. Further research will investigate the use of better methods to implement a formal logic 
and a set of tools that will allow a seamless development cycle from the requirements 
specification to the automatic generation of a monitor circuit.  
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